Sister Cities Going Gender


EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE: CRITICAL COGNITIVE FACTORS IN ACQUIRING NEGOTIATING SKILLS

INSTRUMENTS FOR NEGOTIATION

ANDREA POZZALI

DAVIDE DIAMANTINI

Translated by Donald A. Bathgate for NTL

University of Milan-Bicocca

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1. THE PROJECT

Statistics confirm the very limited presence of women in decision-making processes. This phenomenon affects all areas of political, social, economic, and administrative importance and, with significant variations between North and South, all of the European Union. This is a complex phenomena that is caused by a number of different factors: androcentric models of organisation, insufficient reconciliation services to facilitate women in their professional and political development, lobby-style reasoning, difficulties in raising funds and providing support for female candidacies, but also cognitive processes and forms of representation of reality that differentiate the genders and guide individual and collective behaviour and choices.

The local project *Beyond the glass ceiling*, promoted by the City Council of Turin in the frame of the European project Sister Cities Going Gender, adopts an original perspective on these issues, focusing on the cultural, psychological and cognitive elements that combine to create the gender gap at decision-making levels, through comparison of different socio-economic and sectoral contexts, studying various interpretations and creating new methods of analysis.

*Beyond the glass ceiling* brings together statistics and information about the different degree of representation between women and men at decision-making levels with a cognitive analysis of the deep-rooted reasons that contribute to it. The process made it possible to bring to light hidden elements (lack of inclination among women to stand as candidates and related psychological motives, forms of cooperation/opposition to appointments to decision-making posts, the perception among women and men of candidatures and possible hostility and/or encouragement, personal and popular imagination concerning women in positions of power, hypotheses about the penalties that taking up such posts can have on personal life and feelings, the impact of cultural models, learning methods and ways of internalising information, etc.) that actively
contribute to maintaining a situation of inequality and that, at the same time, do not receive sufficient attention.

Increased awareness about cognitive dynamics enables women to handle decision-making processes with greater determination and tranquillity, while it also breaks down stereotypes and gender-based prejudices that afflict systems and those who work within them. This is thus a parallel and complementary approach to others already practiced, with the same objective of obtaining balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions.
2. THE MANUAL

This manual sets out to provide female personnel employed in both the public and private sectors with tools for developing specific negotiating skills. These skills are required in order to achieve greater efficiency in conducting negotiations in the workplace, and for bargaining career advancement and professional prospects more effectively.

As literature amply shows, there are still significant differences in workplace salary levels between men and women, almost always in favour of the former and to the detriment of the latter. While there are many complementary factors to justify these discrepancies, one possible reason is that, by and large, women are less willing to embark on explicit negotiations with their superiors for career advancement and professional development.

Data from empirical research, prevalently conducted in Great Britain (cfr. Stevens K. C., Bavetta A. G. and Gist M. E., (1993), Gender Differences in the Acquisition of Salary Negotiation Skills: The Role of Goals, Self-Efficacy, and Perceived Control, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78 (5), 723-735), seem to contradict this hypothesis, since no significant diversity is found on this point between men and women. Where the difference between men and women does seem to lie is in their capability of achieving success in negotiating: generally speaking, men seem to be better than women at bringing a negotiation to a successful conclusion.

The cognitive approach to studying the dynamics of negotiation (cfr. Rumiati R. and Pietroni D., (2001), *La negoziazione*, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano) is one way of analyzing in detail whether the difference in the average results achieved by men and women is in any way linked to the specific negotiation strategy adopted which, in turn derives from a particular style of reference in the processes of judgment and decision-making in a situation characterised by
uncertainty. Once these differences are identified, formative initiatives may then be pinpointed which enable the subjects (in this case women) to:

- Acquire greater awareness about their own personal style of negotiation while understanding that it is only one of the many styles possible (and may not even be the most appropriate one);
- Learn to recognize and understand the difference between the many potential negotiation scenarios that occur in real life, dividing them in terms of the negotiation strategy which from time to time would lead to the best result;
- Learn to apply to the diverse negotiation scenarios thus identified the most appropriate negotiating strategies, modulating and where necessary modifying their own personal negotiating styles.
3. COGNITIVE FACTORS IN NEGOTIATIONS

In cognitive terms, negotiating is a highly complex process in which the single parties are called upon to reason, judge and calculate in a way that leads to simplified (heuristic) strategic decision-making, and also increases the chance of making systematic errors of judgment. The cognitive skills necessary to fully comprehend what tasks negotiating involves that a negotiator must be able to apply include, for example relative ones (cfr. Carroll J. S., Bazerman M. H. and Maury R., (1988), “Negotiator cognitions. A descriptive approach to negotiator’s understanding of their opponents”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 41, 352-369):

- understanding one’s “role” (which requires a clear and coherent knowledge of one’s aims, the parameters of the negotiating situation, and the dominion of possible alternative solutions);
- understanding one’s interlocutor (which requires seeking to understand what the counterpart’s aims and dominion of possible alternatives are, imagining what his behaviour pattern might be, and correctly assessing the reasons behind actual behaviour patterns);
- the capability of forecasting plausible outcomes and adjusting them for the possible trajectories of development of the negotiation as it unfolds;
- the capability of implementing one’s knowledge correctly and developing an effective usage of possible negotiating tactics which will lead to the desired objectives.

The components thus outlined very summarily, furthermore, are not mere definitions of primitive units but of quite complex capabilities. Each one depends on the acquisition of ulterior skills which include, for example, being able to pay attention, being able to read and understand both verbal and non-verbal
signals, committing data and important perceived facts to memory, being able to use various types of logic (thought), using one’s imagination, and so on.

Faced with having to implement such an large amount of cognitive information, to boot in situations of high temporal and great emotional pressure, it is understandable for negotiators end up resorting to incorrect reasoning which often leads them to making mistakes. Hereunder are listed some of the most common types of negotiating errors (cfr. Neale M. A. and Bazerman M. H., (1992), “Negotiator cognition and rationality: a behavioral decision theory perspective”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51, 157-175):

1. negotiators allow themselves to be overly influenced by the many ways in which a given risk can be presented, changing their choices according to whether a problem is presented to them in terms of gain or loss;
2. negotiators tend to anchor the numerical estimates they use to assess the minimal and maximal objectives of a negotiation on information which is by and large irrelevant; this often happens even when more important information is available and which, therefore, is ignored;
3. negotiators often do not apply optimal strategies for gathering information; in particular they fall back too frequently on more easily accessible but less informative data, instead of other data more difficult to access but often more relevant;
4. negotiators often have too high an opinion of their capability of achieving the objectives set; they often ignore aspects that can then partially or totally slip from their grasp;
5. more often than not, negotiators are convinced that negotiating situations are mostly fixed sum, namely that one side’s gain is the other side’s loss; this tends to preclude integrative agreements which could benefit both parties;
6. negotiators often follow marked lines of action well beyond the point where it becomes obviously more advantageous to abandon decisions
taken and change strategy; in doing so they show great reluctance to change their mind;
7. negotiators often tend to underestimate information about the behaviour of the counterpart and in particular find it very hard to anticipate his moves and assess them as regards their own strategic choices;
8. negotiators tend to devalue *a priori* any concession made by the other side and can be very reluctant to make any concessions themselves.
4. NEGOTIATION AND GENDER


In particular, what empirical research and literature tend to demonstrate is that in general, differences in negotiating styles between men and women can be explained by the following:

- women are less inclined to resort to the strategy of overbidding, namely setting initial requests very high in order to “anchor” the negotiating situation;
- women are more inclined to follow cooperative negotiating strategies and make more concessions to their negotiating counterpart;
- the tendency of women to make concessions to the counterpart ceases when the counterpart becomes overly aggressive.
5. RESEARCH

The methodological approach selected for this research sought an innovative way of integrating traditional sociological research methods, based on the quantitative analysis of the interaction between the variables of gender and professional advancement profiles, with the most recent contributions made by cognitive psychology, focusing on examining the differences in negotiating styles between men and women.

The city of Turin was found to contain four different organizations, two of which were selected for the context of public administration (Municipality of Turin and Sector 3 Health Service Administration), one for the private sector (Basic.net) and one for the non-profit sector (Gruppo Abele). 12 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted (3 for each specific context), in order to collect empirical data and information regarding the distribution of the career profiles and professional advancement. Interviews were conducted both with those more directly involved in personnel management and also with single employees and managers in order to obtain as objective a framework of the various situations as possible.

The data collected in this phase supported the theory of persistent gender differences in career development and professional advancement: women in particular seem to encounter more difficulty in reaching the top of the hierarchical tree. Paradoxically, these differences are more pronounced in the public than in the private sector. No conclusion seems possible for the non-profit sector because career advancement seems highly undifferentiated for both men and women, which makes it difficult to observe authentic professional advancement.

After collecting the information by interviews, the next step was to refine the tool for empirical research. This consisted in simulating a negotiation for career
advancement. In order to make it easier for the subjects to identify with their role, three specific scenarios were devised: one for each of the two public administrations and one for the private sector. In addition, a blank scenario was also prepared for the non-profit organization.

In total, the test was applied to 73 subjects, 31 males and 42 females, different in professional profile: in other words, care was taken to select subjects in order to ensure adequate representation of the various levels of the organizational hierarchy. On completing the test, the subjects were then asked to respond to a number of questions on age, personal career development and professional advancement and their level of satisfaction with their professional status.
6. RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH

In specific terms, the selected simulated negotiating situation required the subjects to open talks with a direct superior in order to suggest a new project which, if successful, would have a considerable impact on the individual's career prospects\(^1\). This basic structure for the negotiation stayed the same although the details changed from scenario to scenario in order to make it easier for the subjects from the three different contexts to identify with it.

In all the scenarios, the direct superior was a man; precisely because of the gender discrimination which is still present in the workplace, it is more likely that an employee (male or female) would have to deal with a male boss rather than a female one. This probability increases as the hierarchy ladder is scaled – top women managers are much fewer than their male counterparts.

The simulation required each subject to put forward an initial proposal regarding the overall budget necessary for its start-up, and then to begin talks on an additional two issues:

- the level of autonomy granted for project start-up;
- the earmarking of human resources necessary for the project to succeed.

Discussions on these two points took place in three rounds as follows: the subjects put their request forward, basing it on general information indicating what interests were at stake. The counterpart would then provide a first reply to which the subjects, in turn, would have to reply with a second request. The

\(^1\) It is well known that in the Public Administration career advancements follow quite standardized paths: sometimes they are connected with length of service, in other cases they are governed by public concourses. Anyway, we thought it would be interesting to analyze in our research also the public sector, as long as the attainment of professional success is a factor that can exert a positive influence on career progression in all contexts.
counterpart would then have to give a second response followed by an invitation to submit the final request.

The experimental plan selected enabled the following specific variables to be measured:

- the tendency of the subjects to resort to overbidding (measured in the initial budget request for their project);
- the swiftness with which the subjects tended to grant concessions to the counterpart (measured by the *quanta* of shifts from the initial requests and those of the successive negotiating rounds);
- the tendency of the subjects to resort to strategies of log-rolling, compensating between concessions granted and concessions won (this variable can be measured because the subject gave greater importance to one of the issues considered than to the other as can be clearly seen from the information supplied. Furthermore, the counterpart’s replies seemed to indicate that if concessions were granted on the less important issue, a highly favourable outcome would be forthcoming for the more important one);
- the role of emotional variables in negotiation conduct (this variable was measured by a specific wording used for their reply by the counterpart, with a cooperative stance for one of the two negotiating issues and a more aggressive one for the second).

The basic hypotheses for the research were as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** On average, men should have a greater tendency to overbid compared to women; in other words the average request made by a man should be much higher than a woman’s. Note that this overbidding was measured on the initial requests of men and women on the overall budget
assigned to the project. The results of these requests appear in the graph that follows:

As can be seen the difference is remarkable and is also significant in statistical terms. On the whole, therefore, hypothesis 1 is borne out by the data collected.
Hypothesis 2: on average women should have a greater tendency to grant concessions to the counterpart and lower their initial requests. The analysis of the average requests made by men and women on the two negotiating questions gave the following results:

As can be seen, the differences in negotiating conduct between men and women can be seen in both the second and the third rounds of negotiations. These differences indeed seem significant but the sample was too small for definite conclusions to be drawn from it.
Hypothesis 3: the tendency of women to grant on average greater concessions to the counterpart should not emerge in instances where the counterpart adopts a highly aggressive (if not openly offensive) negotiating attitude. Data collected seem to confirm this hypothesis: if only the negotiating issues of the two in which the counterpart adopts a decidedly aggressive stance is considered, it can be seen that the difference between men and women fades completely as can be seen in the following graph:

![SECOND PROPOSAL](image)

The effect of the emotional variable therefore seems able to cancel the tendency of women to adopt a more cooperative negotiating conduct.
7. TOOLS FOR THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

In short our results seem to show that there are indeed differences between the negotiating styles of men and women. These differences seem to derive from the following:

- women are less inclined to resort to overbidding (the negotiating tactic by which initial demands are set high so as to ‘anchor’ the counterpart’s perception and affect his subsequent conduct) compared to men;
- women tend to grant greater concessions to the counterpart than men; furthermore, in this tendency there is also a certain preference to resort to log-rolling strategies, namely to compensate between the various issues at stake;
- when the negotiating counterpart becomes openly hostile or aggressive, it tends to affect women emotionally more than men.

To understand how differences like these can have an impact on the final outcome of negotiations and how certain types of negotiating conduct can be changed in order to achieve better results, we firstly have to supply some general tools for assessing negotiating strategies.

In general, there can be said to be two kinds of negotiating strategy: cooperative and competitive. Cooperative strategies set out to maximise the resources on which negotiating centres. Practices such as parties exchanging proposals and making reciprocal concessions, in which both sides take on and maintain an attitude of mutual respect, willing to make the effort towards being flexible, and taking the other side’s point of view into account are all part of a cooperative negotiating strategy.
Competitive negotiating strategies, on the other hand, are resorted to when one does not wish to augment the value which is being negotiated, but, rather, keep a sizeable part of it for oneself. Examples of conduct typical of this strategy include unilaterally attempting to obtain information and concessions from the counterpart without any reciprocity, being rigid in attitude and delivering threats or ultimatums to the counterpart, and in general all types of conduct characteristic of stiffness and rigidity regarding the counterpart’s claims.

Given that the complexity of negotiations makes it likely that both types of strategy be adopted during the various stages of the talks, prior assumptions regarding how the counterpart’s interest and preference lie can affect the decisions regarding the frequency and temporal sequence with which these different tactics can be brought into play. These decisions can, in turn, have a significant effect on the nature of the results that the parties will be able to achieve.

Each negotiation obliges negotiators to resort to each of the negotiating tactics referred to at different stages of the negotiation: this means that there is no purely competitive or purely cooperative attitude but a mixed negotiating conduct. This, in turn, gives greater significance to the frequency with which negotiators resort to the various strategies, or the timing with which these strategies are alternated.

Even though a cooperative negotiating strategy is crucial for achieving the most favourable outcome of a negotiation, it is necessary to try to imagine what the counterpart’s future conduct is likely to be as it develops. Indeed, there is a real danger that an overly accommodating attitude, especially in the early stages of a negotiation, can be mistaken for a sign of weakness more than of willingness to arrive at an agreement, and could lead the counterpart to adopting a tactic of significant aggression in order to exploit concessions won to his advantage and with no reciprocity.
In addition, granting concessions frequently and unilaterally is not a winning negotiating strategy since it creates the danger that they be systematically undervalued by the counterpart. This so-called ‘retroactive devaluation’ phenomenon is often the cause of mainly sub-optimal negotiating results.

In general, “it seems plausible to suppose that different mechanisms of devaluation can work to varying degrees in different negotiating contexts (in relation to the ambiguity of the terms of the proposals, the nature of the relationship between the original source of the proposal and the person to whom they are directed, and to other contextual factors). It also seems plausible that retroactive devaluation can be more pronounced and have a more disruptive effect in cases where concessions are made unilaterally and accompanied by the implicit or explicit request that they be reciprocated. In such cases the party unilaterally receiving the concessions can be led to believe that his adversary has conceded things of no real value and for this reason be very reluctant, himself, to offer something of value in exchange” (Mnookin R. H. and Ross L., (1995), “Introduction”, in K. J. Arrow (ed), Barriers to conflict resolution, Norton, New York and London, 14).

A further problem in granting unilateral concessions is that they can raise the level of expectancy of the negotiating party who benefits from them and can lead them to believe that the counterpart is obliged to make them because of some intrinsic negotiating weakness. The greater the concession granted the higher will be the expectancy of exploiting this presumed weakness and the lesser the tendency to reciprocate.

Because concessions won are often seen as a signal for dealing a blow to the counterpart’s negotiating strength, it is often more productive in negotiating for these concessions to be preceded by a phase of a stiffer opposition. Indeed, it would appear that the use of ‘carrot and stick’ negotiating tactics (Hilty J. A. and Carnevale P. J., (1993), “Black-hat/white-hat strategy in bilateral negotiation”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55, 444-469),
consisting in taking on a more strongly competitive attitude at the outset of negotiations and then become more cooperative as they unfold, is highly advantageous in bilateral negotiations. During the first stage, one gives the impression of strong personal competitiveness which serves to anchor the perception of the counterpart. Consequently, when openings appear and concession are granted at a later stage, their effect is three-fold:

- firstly, concessions granted in the later stage are perceived as being relatively more significant because of their relation to the neutral reference point of the earlier hostility;
- secondly, concessions granted in the later stage are not taken as a sign of weakness (which would induce the counterpart to adopt a pretentious attitude and demand even more concessions);
- thirdly, it is more likely that demands put forward at the later stage be accepted without demur because the threat of returning to a hostile attitude be would be a credible intimidation against the counterpart.

In these strategies, the initial stage of the talks marked by strong competitiveness serves to ‘anchor’ the counterpart’s expectancy levels, preventing them getting so high through successive offers of concessions that reaching an agreement is jeopardized. Again, in order for the negotiation to succeed, what counts is not so much a simple distinction between cooperative and competitive negotiating tactics but, much more importantly, the relative frequency with which they are deployed and their distribution over time.

A further, highly crucial aspect of negotiating strategy is the strong link between the initial offer and the final result obtained through negotiation. “Research has shown that final agreements in this kind of negotiation are influenced more by initial offers than by the later inclination of the counterpart to making concessions, in particular in cases where the issues negotiated have an uncertain or ambiguous value.” (Bazerman M. H. and Neale M. A., (1993). Negotiating rationally, Free Press, New York, 28).
As has been mentioned, this has important consequences on the negotiating strategy, since a negotiator can attempt to sway how talks unfold by making an initial offer which is very close to the lowest point of acceptance of the counterpart in order to ‘anchor’ it to that particular point of reference, which is precisely what could explain why resorting to the strategy of overbidding seems so widespread. Furthermore, this is also an indirect reason for men generally managing to exploit this to their own advantage in mixed men-women negotiating contexts, while women, who are more inclined to resort to overbidding, often start out from a position of weakness.

In short, and contrary to what it would be logical to assume, it is not enough to adopt a cooperative negotiating attitude with limited overbidding and a general tendency to grant concessions in order to obtain the best results in negotiating. This only works when the counterpart, too, is willing to adopt a cooperative attitude from the very outset of the negotiations, and reciprocate offers.

Whenever the counterpart emerges as being uncooperative at the outset, the best negotiating approach would appear to be to put off being openly accommodating until a later stage and, instead, be less so in the first stage which is crucial for defining both expectancy levels and subjective perception. Only when these definitions have been established is it beneficial to adopt a strategy of cooperation, in order both to prevent the risk of one’s own concessions being devalued by the counterpart and their being taken not as an invitation to cooperate but an indication of weakness which, in turn, leads the counterpart to be opportunistic in his conduct.
Main negotiation models

**Distributive structure**

- Higher motivation towards his/her own profits, lower for the others
- Objective: to maximize his/her own profits
- Competitive relationship
- The enemy: the other’s requests
- Key information: the indifference curve of the other
- Zero sum game: win/loss
- Strategy: contending

**Integrative structure**

- Higher motivation towards his/her own profits, and higher towards the others
- Objective: to reach a Pareto equilibrium
- Co-operative relationship
- The enemy: scarcity of resources
- Key information: the interests’ structure of the other
- Variable sum game: win/win
- Strategy: problem solving
8. GUIDELINES TO PROMOTE COOPERATION IN NEGOTIATION

At the end of our research we would like to synthesize a few critical points that can have a deep impact on negotiation outcomes. In order to promote cooperative behaviors and increase the possibilities of reaching an optimal agreement, some variables must be analyzed and checked with particular attention. These are:

1) The quality of relations

*Promote trust* = one must enter a negotiations with a positive trust in the possibility of interact and cooperate with the counterpart. A negative attitude strongly limits the possibility of reaching an agreement.

*Being assertive* = assertiveness is needed in order to stimulate a symmetrical cooperative stance in the counterpart.

*Create empathy* = one must try to understand the counterpart’s point of view, in order to integrate explicit information with other motivational factors that can remain unexpressed.

*Engage in active listening* = all proposals, observations and comments expressed by the counterpart must be carefully listened and analyzed.

*Use a pleasant communicative style* = personal characteristics can have an impact on negotiation outcomes: it is therefore important to maintain an appropriate communicative and physical style.

2) The quality of communication processes

*Be a good interviewer* = promoting the communication is needed in order to gather useful information. Quite often, this aim can be reached by conducting a sort of simulated interview.

*Be the first to start concessions* = starting to make concessions is a simple, but often quite effective mean to promote cooperation.
Go beyond consolidated positions = it is very important not to remain anchored to given positions. One must always try to create new possible solutions and to prospect alternative negotiation outcomes.

Formulate multiple proposals = all possible negotiation outcomes must be articulated in a plurality of issues and alternatives.

Keep a negotiation agenda = the different phases of a negotiation must be organized in a clear and articulated way. This can be easier if a negotiation agenda is kept.

3) The quality of creative processes

Recognising differences = differences of positions and points of view must be explicitly recognised and agreed upon. This helps to clear the different priorities and facilitates the cooperative restructuring of the negotiation. Differences can involve:

- Preferences
- Expectations
- Risk propensities
- Temporal dimension
- Capacities and resource endowments

Strategies to widen negotiation possibilities can be synthesized in five general steps:

1 - Extension: Searching for new resources to put on the bargaining table;
2 – In depth analysis: Breaking down the negotiation problem in different components;
3 – Compensation: Offering an own succedaneous good to compensate for the counterpart’s concessions;
4 – Indemnification: Offering a non-succedaneous indemnity;
5 – Going beyond: Finding a new resource to satisfy counterpart’s unexpressed expectations.
A check list of the different phases and strategies can be an useful aid to negotiators. The following table can be taken as an example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clearly state the negotiation aims</th>
<th>What kind of aims am I looking for?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control temporal pressure</td>
<td>Are there any elements that can create a temporal pressure? How can they be eliminated or reduced?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start by resolving marginal problems and use these successes when focal points are examined</td>
<td>Which are the elements that offer the best possibilities for an initial agreement?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be flexible in methods selection, while keeping a firm stance on priority aims</td>
<td>Priority aims have been clearly identified?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to limit the presence of disturbance elements or external factors</td>
<td>Which are the disturbance elements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce moments of decompression</td>
<td>Am I controlling the degree of tension in order to allow for a break?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to promote a global vision of the interaction</td>
<td>Am I trying to introduce a strategic vision of the negotiation problem and of the possible outcomes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly state and show the possibilities that can develop after the reaching of an agreement</td>
<td>Benefits that can depend on the reaching of an agreement have been described?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote mid and long term benefits of the negotiation agreement</td>
<td>Mid and long term benefits following the agreements have been identified?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep a cooperative attitude</td>
<td>Explicit efforts to promote cooperation have been made?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not make comparison with other situations</td>
<td>Negative elements of comparison with other situations have been avoided?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not feed hard feelings</td>
<td>My negotiation behavior is affected by bed feelings and grudges that I am not able to overcome?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be quick in rewarding cooperation and in pointing out counterpart’s bad moves</td>
<td>Am I quick enough in responding to counterpart’s moves?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep an appropriate communicative and physical style of behaving</td>
<td>How am I behaving?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>